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Abstract—The security in satellite communications is a key
issue due to the large footprint of the beams. This it is
specially critical in IoT devices that transmit data directly to
satellite. Take into account that IoT devices are characterized
by transmitting packets of short length. Consequently, it means
that it is not feasible to augment the security level of the
IoT packets via complex cryptographic algorithms. Otherwise,
their packed length may be increased in a non-negligible way
which could augment their collision probability, latency and
energy consumption. For this reason, this paper proposes to
take advantage of the time-packing technique. By doing so, it is
possible to use the overlapping degree among the pulse-shapes to
boost the secrecy-capacity. In particular, the overlapping degree
between the pulse-shapes introduces an artificial interference
that degrades the eavesdropper’s channel. In this regard, it
is necessary to highlight that there is a residual co-channel
interference in the satellite beams. So, it means that these two
sources of impairments make difficult to estimate the legitimate
user’s transmission parameters by the eavesdropper.
Index Terms—IoT, Satellite, Physical-Layer security, High-
Spectral Efficient Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the forecast for the European market for IoT
is a yearly 19.8% increase up to reach $241 billion in
2025. This strong growing will be concentrated in verticals
from manufacturing, utilities, retail and transportation [1],
[2]. However in order to monetize the potential services
over IoT it is necessary to guarantee the security of the
communications. This is specially important in IoT devices
that are directly connected to satellite.
M2M communications are characterized by the transmission
of short length packets in a bursty and asynchronous way
through a wireless channel. Moreover, IoT devices have strict
energy constraints in order to extend their battery time-life. It
implies that to guarantee the security of their communications
it is not possible resort to complex cryptographic schemes.
Otherwise, the packed length of the IoT protocols may be
increased in a non-negligible way which could augment
their collision probability, latency and energy consumption
[3]. Given that they will be deployed at large-scale it is
realistic to consider that potential eavesdroppers may be
This work has received funding from the Spanish Ministry of Science,
Innovation y Universities under project TERESA-TEC2017-90093-C3-1-R
(AEI/FEDER,UE); and from the Catalan Government (2017 SGR 891 and
2017 SGR 1479
interested in the information transmitted by the IoT devices.
This situation is critical in satellite communications due
to the large dimensions of their footprints. Hence multiple
eavesdroppers may overhear the transmitted information. As
a result, it is proposed to use a complementary technique to
the cryptographic one to increase the security level of the
M2M communications.
In this regard physical-layer security methods may
complement higher-layer encryption techniques by exploiting
the characteristics of wireless channels. For this purpose, it is
resorted to the secrecy-capacity metric. More specifically, it
was shown in [4] that reliable information-theoretic security
could be achieved, whenever the eavesdropper’s channel be
a degraded version of the legitimate user’s channel. In this
case, if the secrecy rate is chosen below the secrecy-capacity,
then reliable transmissions can be achieved in perfect secrecy.
However, the time-varying fading effect of wireless channels
degrades the secrecy-capacity. In this situation, it is used the
ergodic capacity to measure the secrecy-capacity [5].
In order to make difficult the overhearing process of
the eavesdroppers, this paper proposes to resort to time-
packing strategy [6]- [7]. Thus, the time-duration of the
transmitted frames are reduced which: i) improves the
interception probability of the packets, ii) augments the
spectral efficiency of the M2M communications without
increasing the transmission bandwidth, iii) diminishes the
effect of Doppler spread in Non-GEO communications, and
iv) permits to use the overlapping degree among the pulse-
shapes to boost the secrecy-capacity. This overlapping degree
introduces a multi-path channel known by the legitimate user
but ignored by the eavesdropper. This strategy of security
is similar to the Artificial Noise (AN) pursues [5]- [9],
but without wasting energy for jamming the eavesdropper’s
channel.
This paper is divided as follows. Section I explains the
signal models of the legitimate and eavesdropper users as well
as the satellite channel model. Next, Section II analyzes the
mutual information of the legitimate user and the eavesdrop-
per. After that Section III defines the secrecy-capacity when
the plaintext of the IoT devices is encoded using time-packing
strategy. Finally, the sections of results and conclusions come.
II. SIGNAL MODELS
In this section we present the signal models of the legitimate
user, eavesdropper, and the communication channel for a
satellite link.
A. Signal Model of the Legitimate and Eavesdropper
In the following we provide the mathematical expressions
that describe the signal model of the legitimate user and the
eavesdropper. In the satellite field, we have the forward and
the return links. In our scenario the forward link transmits
the message from the Earth-Station to the IoT device, i.e.
the legitimate user. On the return link, the IoT device sends
the information to the Earth-Station, which takes the role of
legitimate user. In both situations the eavesdropper could be
located either at the space or on the terrestrial surface. In any
case, the message at the k-th time instant is given by
xd[k] = sd[n] · pd[k], −Lp/2 < k < Lp/2 (1)
where sd[n] and pd[k] are the n-th modulated symbol and the
pulse that shapes the information message, whereas Lp is the
number of samples of the pulse shape. Next, under flat fading






xd[k−q ·MTF ]+ηl[k], (2)
where hl[k] is the channel impulse response from the trans-
mitter to the legitimate user, NI is the number of time-packed
interference symbols before and after the current symbol to
estimate, and MTP is the separation between consecutive
pulses according to the time-packing strategy. If M denotes
the oversampling factor, then the overlapping degree between
pulses, denoted as τ , will be:
τ = 1− MTP
M
, (0 < MTP ≤M) (3)
Note that for MTP =M , the overlapping degree is zero τ = 0,
and we have the Nyquist sampling case. Next, ηl[k] represents
the additive noise plus the residual co-channel interference






hl,p[k] · xp[k] +
√
Pnl · υl[k], (4)
being hl,p the channel between the p-th interference signal,
denoted as xp, and the legitimate user, whereas Il and Pnl
are the power of the co-channel interference and the Additive
White Gaussian (AWG) noise. Similarly, the signal model that






where he[k] is the channel impulse response from the trans-
mitter to the eavesdropper and ηe[k] represents the additive
Fig. 1. Time-packed pulse-shape, τ=50% of overlapping. Pulses with ISI.
noise plus the residual co-channel interference term from other






he,p[k] · xp[k] +
√
Pne · υe[k], (6)
being he,p the channel between the p-th interference signal and
the eavesdropper. At this point, we show in Fig.1, five consec-
utive pulse-shapes when their overlapping degree is τ = 50%.
Note the presence of ISI when the pulses overlap among them.
Generally, the presence of ISI in a communication channel
has been considered as an impairment. Nevertheless, this type
of ISI can be controlled by the transmitter. After presenting
the signal models of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper,
we introduce the satellite channel model and re-interpret it in
terms of security. The following section details it.
B. Satellite Channel Model
Regarding the statistical channel, we assume that the chan-
nel amplitude has some time variations. If this variation is
small, then it can be modeled as a Rician distribution [10]-
[12]. The Rician channel is the superposition of a constant
signal and another one that varies in a random way as:
hRician = a+
√
2 · σ2 · hRandom (7)
Being a the parameter that models the Line Of Sight (LoS)
component whereas hRandom is a Complex Gaussian signal
of zero mean and deviation σ. In this situation, if r denotes
the channel’s envelope, i.e. r = |hRician|, then the Rician
probability distribution function is described as [12]:











2 · r ·
√
K · (K + 1)
P
)
, (r ≥ 0) (8)
where P is the channel power; equated as P = a2 +2 · σ2,
whereas K is the so called vanishing factor of the Rician
distribution and represents the relationship between the LoS





Thus, from (9) if the vanishing factor K → ∞, then the
deviation of the random component of the channel goes to
zero, i.e. σ → 0, and so, the power of the LoS component
tends to P . Conversely, if K → 0, then the LoS component
of the channel goes to zero, i.e. a→ 0, whereas the power of
its random part goes to P , i.e. 2 ·σ2 → P . Note from (8) that
if we increase the K parameter the distribution of the signal
tends to a Gaussian one which mean closes to the power of
the LoS component and smaller variance. In this situation
the channels of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper
are practically the same and so, the secrecy-capacity is
reduced. This case happens in satellite communications
since the magnitude of the vanishing factor K is around
K ∈ {17−20} dB [13], [14]. At this point we have to remark
that we have no assumed that the eavesdropper and legitimate
user’s channels could be located in different environments
[15]. Otherwise, the geographic position of the legitimate
user and the eavesdropper and their elevation angles may
impact on the secrecy-capacity. However, this part has been
considered out of the scope of this work.
Finally, after presenting the signal models of the legitimate
user, eavesdropper and channel we detail, in the following
section, the computation of their mutual information.
III. ANALYSIS OF MUTUAL INFORMATION
In the process of computing the mutual information, we
have considered that the legitimate user has exact knowledge
of the time-packing multi-path interference (See Fig. 2a).
Regarding the eavesdropper we have assumed two possible
scenarios: i) it is not able to resolve the time-packed interfer-
ence (See Fig. 2b) and ii) it estimates the time-packed multi-
path interference (See Fig. 2c).
A. Mutual Information of the Legitimate user’s detector
The analysis conducted in this section takes from granted
that optimal MAP decoding is feasible, which means that
the law of the detector is governed by the exact conditional
probability density functions. Without loss of generality, the
mutual information can be defined as:
I(s[n]; yl[n]) = H(yl([n])−H(yl[n]|s[n]), (10)
where s[n] = [s−NI · · · sNI ], H(yl([n]) is the entropy of the
received signal, and H(yl[n]|s[n]) represents the entropy of
the received signal conditioned to the transmitted symbols.
Assuming that the co-channel interference and the noise are
Gaussian distributed, the entropy of H(yl[n]|s[n]) is:
H(yl[n]|s[n]) = log2(π · e · (Pnl + Il)), (11)
being Pnl the variance of the AWG noise and Il the power
of the co-channel interference that observes the legitimate
user. Resorting to MonteCarlo integration, H(yl[n]|s[n]) can







Fig. 2. Receiver architectures for the a) legitimate user, b) eavesdropper
without estimating time-packing multi-path interference and c) eavesdropper
able to estimate the time-packing interference.
where yl[n] is the n-th realization of the received signal and
N = 106 is the number of realizations. Next, if we apply




p(yl[n]|s[n]) · p(s[n]) (13)
being A the alphabet of the transmitted symbol with a cardi-
nality Q. The expression p(s[n]) stands for the probability of
the received signal conditioned to the transmitted symbols and
p(s) represents the a priori probabilities of the symbols. If it
is assumed that all transmitted symbols are equiprobable and
independent, then:




















being hq[n] the channels that results from the convolution
between the pulse shapes of the current symbol to estimate and
the q-th time-packed interference symbol, and it is formulated
as:
hq[n] = p[k] ∗ p[k − q ·MTF ]|k=n·MTF (16)
After showing the mutual analysis of the legitimate user’s
detector we analyze the eavesdropper’s mutual information in
the following section.
B. Mutual Information of the Eavesdropper’s detector
In this scenario we have considered two possible
architectures for the eavesdropper: i) it unknowns the time-
packed multi-path interference, and ii) it has some strategy to
estimate the time-packed multi-path interference. In the first
case the time-packed multi-path interference is considered as
noise whereas in the second one it is partially known. The
following sections detail both cases.
1) Eavesdropper without estimating time-packed interfer-
ence: In this scenario we have that the mutual information
can be defined as:
I(s[n]; ye[n]) = H(ye([n])−H(ye[n]|s[n]), (17)
where s[n] = s0 being s0 the current symbol to esti-
mate, H(ye([n]) is the entropy of the received signal, and
H(ye[n]|s[n]) represents the entropy of the received signal
conditioned to the current transmitted symbol. Assuming that
the co-channel and the time-packed multi-path interference
plus the additive noise are Gaussian distributed, the entropy
of H(ye[n]|s[n]) is:
H(ye[n]|s[n]) = log2(π · e · (Pne + Ie + ITPe)), (18)
being ye[n] is the n-th realization of the received signal, Ie
the co-channel interference that experiments the eavesdropper,















p(ye[n]|s[n]) · p(s[n]) (20)
The expression p(ye[n]|s[n]) stands for the probability of the
received signal conditioned to the transmitted symbol and
p(s[n]) represents the a priori probability of the current symbol
to estimate. If it is assumed that all transmitted symbols are
equiprobable and independent, then:
















At this point we have derived the mutual information for an
eavesdropper that not estimate the time-packed interference.
Next, we show how to compute it for an eavesdropper that
estimates the time-packed multipath interference.
2) Smart Eavesdropper: In this case we have assumed that
the eavesdropper partially knows the time-packed multi-path
interference. Consequently, it means that exists an error in the
channel estimation, denoted as PTP e , which can be equated
as:











where N̂I is the estimation that does the eavesdropper about
the number of pulses that generate the time-packed multi-
path interference. Next, if it is assumed that the co-channel
interference, the additive noise and the partially estimated
time-packed multi-path interference are Gaussian distributed,
then the entropy of H(ye[n]|s[n]) is:
H(ye[n]|s[n]) = log2(π · e · (Pne + Ie + PTP e)), (24)
where s[n] = [s−N̂I · · · sN̂I−1]. If it is assumed that all
transmitted symbols are equiprobable and independent, then
p(s[n]) is:
















being PT the power of all interference signals, i.e. PT =
Pne + Ie + PTP e . Finally, after deriving the mathematical
expressions of the mutual information for the legitimate user
and the eavesdropper, we formulate the secrecy-capacity in the
following section.
IV. SECRECY-CAPACITY
Generally speaking, secrecy-capacity is determined by both
the qualities of the main channel, i.e., the channel between the
transmitter and the legitimate user, and the wiretap channel,
i.e. the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper.
The secrecy-capacity for an instantaneous value of the channel
in the quasi-static fading scenario is [17], [18]:
CS = Il(s[n]; yl[n])− Ie(s[n]; ye[n]), (27)
where the mutual information of the legitimate user and the
eavesdropper have been formulated in the previous section.
However, the instantaneous secrecy-capacity is different for
each channel fading realizations. In order to evaluate the
security in a long-term sense, i.e. across multiple coherent
Fig. 3. Secrecy-Capacity of the legitimate user respect the two possible types
of eavesdroppers when the overlapping degree is τ = 25%(See Section II)
time slots, average secrecy-capacity was proposed in [19] as
performance metric. To be more specific, the average secrecy-
capacity is equal to the maximum average instantaneous





CS(hl, he) · p(hl) · p(he) · dhl · dhe, (28)
After formulating the secrecy-capacity we present the results
in the following section.
V. RESULTS
This section evaluates the secrecy-capacity for the legitimate
user and the two possible types of eavesdroppers when the
transmitted signal is time-packed in terms of the vanishing
factor of the Rician channel. Fig.3 shows the secrecy-capacity
when the vanishing factor of the channel varies from K=30
to K=100 in steps of 5. The overlapping degree between
the consecutive pulses is τ = 25%. There the residual co-
channel interference and the noise power of the legitimate
user and the eavesdropper are equal to Il = Ie = −15dB
and Pnl = Pne = 10dB respectively. The results show that
if it used time-packing to encode the transmission data, then
exists a secrey-capacity region at large vanishing factors of the
Rician channel. As a result, it means that the transmitter can
select a rate, so-called secrecy-rate that falls in the outage
region of the eavesdropper’s capacity. In this situation the
eavesdropper is not able to decode the plaintext message and
so, it is guaranteed the secrecy of the communications.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have evaluated the technique of time-
packing as alternative to the well-known artificial noise tech-
nique for increasing the secrecy-capacity of IoT communi-
cations over satellite. Note that the satellite channel model
has a large Line of Sight (LoS) component. So, it means
that the channel of the eavesdropper and the legitimate user
could be quite similar in the same beam. However, the use
of the time-packing technique introduces an artificial multi-
path interference that degrades the eavesdropper’s channel.
In this case, we have considered two types of eavesdropper:
i) without being able to estimate the time-packing multi-
path, and ii) equipped with an estimation block of the time-
packing interference. In the first case, all interference signals
are considered as noise whereas in the second one part of the
interference is assumed as noise. In both cases, it is possible
to obtain a secrecy-capacity. Finally, comment that in the
satellite field there is a residual co-channel interference. This
interference limits the resolution of the eavesdroppers although
they be equipped with multiple antennas. Consequently, in this
paper we have considered that eavesdropper does not have full
knowledge of the time-packed multi-path interference. Similar
approach was followed in [9]. However, there the rain losses
made difficult to obtain perfect channel estimations.
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